SARS and biothreat preparedness – a survey of ACT general practitioners
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.33321/cdi.2005.29.27Keywords:
communicable diseases, disease control, severe acute respiratory syndrome, general practiceAbstract
In late 2003 and early 2004 the ACT Division of General Practice and the ACT Health conducted two concurrent surveys designed to identify knowledge, attitudes and practices of Australian Capital Territory (ACT) general practitioners around severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and biothreat preparedness. One survey asked individual general practitioners (GPs) about how they gathered information about SARS in 2003, how they preferred to receive information, current practices, and how they perceived the threat of SARS and other infectious agents. The second survey asked practice principals how they organised their practice to respond to the SARS threat in 2003, any difficulties they had with implementing this response, use of SARS infection control guidelines and current policies. The response rate for the individual GP survey was 48 per cent (184/381) and the response rate for the practice organisation survey was 54 per cent (74/136). GPS used many sources of information on SARS during the 2003 outbreak. Facsimiles from the ACT Division of General Practice were the primary source (17%) and facsimile was the preferred method of receiving information in future outbreaks. The majority of GP respondents felt adequately informed about SARS during the 2003 outbreak, but many general practices did not follow the national guidelines on telephone screening of patients, warning signs and having infection control kits available. The majority of practices reported that they had policies or procedures in place to isolate potentially infectious patients from others in the waiting room. GPs rated an influenza pandemic as a threat to themselves and their patients much more highly than SARS or bioterrorism. Suggestions and comments on how ACT GPs could be better prepared to respond to future outbreaks included the need for timeliness of information, information delivery mechanisms, communication issues, education, the availability of guidelines and protocols, planning, role delineation, the use of response teams, provision of equipment, and vaccination. Planning for future infectious disease outbreak events in the Australian Capital Territory should incorporate general practitioners so that the plans reflect what is a feasible response in the general practice setting. Commun Dis Intell 2005;29:277–282.
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